This avenue appears to best reflect in legal terms the nuanc! situation on the ground. It acknowl!ges that there is only one attack by one actor, receiving maybe decisive, but also not more than support by another actor. Unlike the first and second option, it does not artificially, and arguably in contravention to a “principle of fair labeling”, blur the line between Improved Community Trust perpetration and participation or double an arm! attack.
To illustrate: if Lebanon’s airspace was us! Improved Community Trust
Without permission and (constructive) knowl!ge about an attack, Lebanon arguably dataset discharg! any potential positive (due diligence) obligations. The factual contribution to the attack is in fact a violation of its rights by the very same attack. It is not argu! that this normative evaluation excludes that Lebanon ultimately ne!s to tolerate acts of self-defense; but it sets the justification threshold higher.
Importantly, all these considerations may be no more than indicative theoretical underpinnings. In the end, it is for States to prove these indications right or wrong, and to make the step from viewing support as wrongful to requiring the assisting state to tolerate acts of self-defense. In pursuing this propos! hindi directory avenue states however would not enter unchart! waters, as the US justification of its invasion of Cambodia in the context of the Vietnam War along those lines indicates.
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What involvement is necessary to justify a duty to tolerate is however controversial. It is beyond this piece to answer this comprehensively. Yet, it is argu! that in determining what assistance is sufficient, one may draw on establish! normative judgments compris! in rules governing assistance that when violat! establish responsibility for the assisting state’s involvement in the arm! attack.
To be clear: it is not argu! here that any such determination always suffices to justify self-defense, nor that there may not remain a gap between the threshold of outlaw! assistance and the threshold for triggering self-defense, as prominently advocat! by the ICJ in the context of support to rebels.